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The power triangle strategy in the Middle East after the Arab Spring
Based on the Offensive and Defensive Realism

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Abstract—Following the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa plus Afghanistan, we saw a change in the structure of power. In fact, with the Egyptian revolution in 2011, the change of government in Libya, Tunisia, Syrian crisis and Afghanistan have changed the course of many issues. Some countries that have benefited from a better position in the Arab Spring have actually decided to change their behavior and focus on strategies and policies to falsify the right position. Three of these countries have stable states in the Middle East. With the development of the region, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have taken power. Iran has been linked by Iraq and Syria, Turkey in Syria and northern Iraq against P.K. K¹, Finally, Saudi Arabia in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. The key points of the central analysis of these events are to help assess the foreign policy of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. Why are these countries seeking influence in the region? What approach do regional players take in the Middle East? This study defines the foreign policy of these countries, provides explanations about the competition of these powers, and generalizes their policy through the theory of realism, especially defensive and Offensive realism

Keywords— *Foreign Policy, Realism, Middle East, Defensive and Offensive realism*

I. INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf have undergone several significant changes, which are turning points in the region's development history. Some of these are: the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the Second Persian Gulf War (2003), September

11, 2001, the major developments in the Arab Spring (2011). The Arab Spring and subsequent changes in the political system in some countries like Afghanistan, in addition to regional and supra-regional actors, have a profound effect on regional security and political interactions in shaping the evolution of relative power and other scales. The incident marked a turning point in the development of the new structure in the Middle East. On the one hand, the change in the role, influence and interests of regional and international actors, On the other hand, the emergence of new coalitions in the region.

Developments have prompted Persian Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, to view the event as a threat to its security and to its policy of active intervention, before a wave of change in its borders and the region's unbalanced power. However, the country was initially affected by the Syrian crisis and the Bahraini protests in the Arab world, which was called the Arab Spring. Very quickly, the scene of confrontation between regional and supra-regional powers, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, turned the states against each other. Turkey itself is interfering in the active politics of regional power and is not going to be considered an isolated actor. The nature of this approach of the government is contradictory for regional developments, and it sees the contradictory goals pursued by its leaders, thus adding to the unrest in Syria. Iran immediately supported the adoption of a political solution to the crisis but by supporting Assad's government. Turkey supports Assad's opponents; Saudi Arabia used military forces in Yemen and Bahrain to suppress the opposition but supported it in Syria.

Given the impact of Iran's strategic relations with Syria on the flow of resistance in the region, the Syrian crisis is very important for Iran. Saudi Arabia's policy on the Syrian crisis can be defined in the context of defense realism, while Turkey and Iran's policy in the region can be interpreted as Offensive and Defensive realism.

The main question is: what is the approach of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to regional developments? The author argues that Iran's foreign policy in the region (Middle East), with the support of Shiites in the region, pursues ideological elements, which are defensive, and that the policies of Turkey and Saudi Arabia are in some way opposed to that approach. The position of the two countries, the purchase of their weapons, and the expansionist efforts to achieve their goals are also consistent with the theory of offensive and defensive realism. (See Table 3, page 19). However, in the case of Syria, their strategies are different. In the first part of this study, we will define the theory of defensive and offensive realism, before examining the foreign policy approach of Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia as a discussion of developments in the Middle East.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Understanding government behavior in anarchic conditions or providing a good theory for foreign policy is the most important goal of international relations awareness. Realism theory is the leading model in international relations in the process of analyzing and explaining changes in the international system. The debates in this algorithm have led to the emergence of a new hypothesis from within. The main approaches are Hans Jay Morgenthau's Classical Realism, neorealism (structural realism) by Kenneth Waltz, neoclassical realism by Gideon Rose and offensive and defensive realism arising from neorealism. All of these theories have based on "Realism," but with minor differences in their ideas on a number of fundamental issues in international relations, such as security, anarchy, and so on.

TABLE 1. ASSUMPTION OF REALISM

Human Nature	→	Selfish
Most Important Actors	→	State
Causes of State Behavior	→	Rational pursuit of self-interest
Nature of International System	→	Anarchy

The realistic approach to international politics divided into two types: offensive and defensive:

III. OFFENSIVE REALISM

Zakaria and Mearsheimer are among the most important Offensive theorists. This kind of power of political inclination is the starting point for discussion of insulting discourses, revisionist powers, especially the great powers, in the international system, and by emphasizing the chaos in the

international environment, they believe that anarchy is competition between the main powers. Controlling power will be permanent. For them, the Hobbesian chaos is a condition that security is very rare. Wealthy nations seek to create large armies; the secret of their borders is to increase their international influence (Zakaria, 1998, p. 3). Mearsheimer's main reason for dedicating himself to the government in three cases: the anarchic structure of the international system, all countries have the ability to offend. In addition, have expressed distrust of the enemies' goals. These three hypothetical opportunities to balance and maintain the balance of power that countries are involved in provide not only power but also a powerful incentive to maximize power.

In offensive realism, power is the main means of achieving the goal and gaining hegemonic status in the international system, their emphasis is mainly on military and economic power because it is the military power of a country that increases the security factor. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.52, Waltz, 1979, p.66) This kind of realism that insists on the centrality of the big states where big powers are trying to The disturbing realities of the changing maintaining existing afford to achieve its goals in the region. Realists offensive based on the following arguments have achieved such a result:

- Realists believe, offensive international chaos is very important. In this world, the wisdom governments that are looking for security tend to take measures that might lead to conflict with others.
- Because state power means the loss of another state power, relative power of governments to apply a zero-sum game that a result of ending the game, is conflict and struggle.
- Distrust the motives of the actors, permanent feature of the international system of anarchy and is divided into two categories: One of distrust of the current incentives and other actors if there is trust, there is no guarantee a stable situation. In the context concerns, the crop coming from an actor can cooperate in the current situation is also precarious.
- The issue of fraud and greedy government's phenomenon is continuing anarchy in the system. Greedy governments, the governments that are not for security, but also for wealth, ambition, power, and personal desire to regulate relations. Yet the government has always may be based on your relationship with your security setting, but the opportunity will be a fraud in their work.
- The aim of all governments' revisionist access to the hegemonic status in the international system. Therefore, this category of Government strongly seeking power, and if conditions are right, demanding to change the distribution of power in their favor. (Snyder, 2002, p. 151)

IV. DEFENSIVE REALISM

The most important defense theorists are Robert Jarvis, Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Oura, and Charles

Glaser. In addition, a realist of Kenneth Waltz can be considered as a defensive realist.

Defensive realism believes that the government seeks to maintain its existence in the system of international anarchy. Proponents of the theory of the relationship between anarchy and the implications for the international system on the one hand and behavior of states, on the other hand, are concerned, but they complicate the relationship. Only on condition that other countries feel threatened by the self-react and their reactions usually in balance and prevent threatening the country. (Layne, 2003, p. 321)

Waltz attached great importance to the theory of balance of power. War and military force to maintain the status quo is beneficial not to change the system. Stephen Walt, unlike the balance of power, introduced the Balance of threat theory, which has proposed by trying to improve and increase the efficiency of the theory of balance of power. The balance of power does not explain why the balances are often incapable of Formative. (Walt, 1988, p. 281) Walt believes that the government only the power to do not balance, but an accomplice to balance the threat of attack. According to shortcomings of the theory of balance of power, Stephen Walt contends that the balance of threat theory can offer a better explanation Walt described the threat level with respect to the fourth factor:

- I. Ability (population, economic strength, the vastness of the country and other factors, geopolitical power)
- II. Geographical proximity
- III. Military Capabilities
- IV. Aggressive intentions. (Ibid, p. 295)

Defensive realists argue that a defensive action by invoking the concept of security has often wrongly interpreted as a belligerence behavior. Governments that threaten the ability of others, will Respond with military measures. Unlike offensive and defensive realism, assumption is that international anarchy is usually benign. This means that security is not rare. As a result, governments have aggressive behavior, and only if they feel threatened, they react to it. In addition, this reaction often at the level of balance or prevent serious security threat, and only if the problem is clear, the reactions will occur harder conflict. (Snyder, 2002, p. 163)

Offensive and defensive approaches are two major differences: The first is that government security offensive in reducing the deliberate search of security in other countries, while the government does not act defensively. Second, the government attacking each other's security to be intentional uses threatening, while the defensive deliberate each other's security do not threaten. (Shiping, 2008, p.96)

Defensive neorealism asserts that aggressive expansion as promoted by offensive Neorealist upsets the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory, thereby decreasing the primary objective of the state, which they argue is ensuring its security. (Layne, 2003, p. 306) While defensive realism does not deny the reality of interstate conflict, nor that

incentives for state expansion do exist, it contends that these incentives are sporadic rather than endemic. Defensive neorealism points towards "structural modifiers" such as the security dilemma and geography, and elite beliefs and perceptions to explain the outbreak of conflict. (Taliaferro, 2001, p. 125)

Defensive structural realists break with the other main branch of structural realism, offensive realism, over whether or not states must always be maximizing relative power ahead of all other objectives. While the offensive realist believes this to be the case, some defensive realists believe that the offense-defense balance can favor the defender, creating the possibility that a state may achieve security. A second-strike capable nuclear arsenal has often understood to indicate the supremacy of the defense in the offense-defense balance, essentially guaranteeing security for the state that possesses it. Yet in a multi-polar world, a second-strike capability does not provide the same guarantees that it did during the bi-polar Cold War period. Some defensive realists also differ from their offensive counterparts in their belief that states may signal their intentions to one another. If a state can communicate that its intentions are benign to another state, then the security dilemma may be overcome. (Glaser, 1994, p.50) Finally, many defensive realists believe that domestic politics can influence a state's foreign policy; offensive realists tend to treat states as black boxes. (Walt, 1998, p.29) In modern times, several economic and political groups are known to benefit from the effects Defensive Realism, in terms of both the economic activity generated in delivering the resources or technology needed to increase a particular state's own security, as well as the positive feedback effect caused by the perceived destabilization to an opponent's own security by comparative observation.

TABLE 2: DEFENSIVE & OFFENSIVE CRITERIA

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, VOL. 25, NO. 3 (WINTER 2000/01), P.

Defensive Realism	Offensive Realism
system which encourages states to maintain moderate and reserved policies in order to attain security	System in which state seek to maximize power and influence in order to achieve security through domination and hegemony
Basic principle: 'Security Maximization'	Basic principle: 'Power Maximization'
In simple words protecting own power	In simple words projecting own power

Category of Contemporary Realism- Assumption about Anarchy

✓ The International system provides incentives for expansion only under certain conditions	✓ The International system always provides incentives for expansion
✓ Balance-of-power theory (Kenneth Waltz)	✓ Hegemony theory of war (Robert Gilpin)
✓ Dynamic Differentials theory (Dale Copeland)	✓ Power transition theory (A.F.K.Organski and Jacek Kugler)
✓ Great power cooperation theories (Robert Jervis, Charles Glaser, Benjamin Miller.	✓ Balance of interest theory (Randall schweler) Theory of great power politics (John Mearsheimer)
✓ Balance of threat theory (Stephen Walt)	✓ State centered realism (Fareed Zakaria)
✓ Domestic Mobilization theory (Thomas Christensen)	✓ Theory of war aims (Erik Labs)
✓ Offense- Defense theory Stephen van Evra, Thomas Christensen, Jack Snyder, Charls Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann.	✓ Hegemonic theory of foreign policy. (William Wohlforth)

emphasis offensive realism puts on hegemony as states end aim stands in sharp contrast to defensive realism's belief that state survival can be guaranteed at some point well short of hegemony. In a defensive realist mindset, security increments by power accumulation end up experiencing diminishing marginal returns where costs eventually outweigh benefits. (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 271 & 345) Defensive realism posits that under anarchy there is a strong propensity for states to engage in balancing—states shouldering direct responsibility to maintain the existing balance of power—against threatening power-seeking states, which may, in turn, succeed in "jeopardize (ing) the very survival of the maximizing state. (Tuft, 2005, p. 390). This argument also applies to state behavior towards the most powerful state in the international system as defensive realists note that an excessive concentration of power is self-defeating, triggering balancing countermoves. (Wang, 2004, p.177)

Yet, Mearsheimer challenges these claims by making the argument that it is rather difficult to estimate when states have reached a satisfactory amount of power short of hegemony and costly to rely extensively on balancing as an efficient power-checking method due to collective action issues. (Snyder, 2002, p.155) According to him, when a great power finds itself in a defensive posture trying to prevent rivals from gaining power at its expense, it can choose to engage in balancing or intervene by favoring buck-passing—transferring the responsibility to act onto other states while remaining on the sidelines. In order to determine the circumstances in which great powers behave according to one or the other, Mearsheimer builds on Waltz defensive realism by including a second variable (geography) alongside the distribution of power. On one hand, the choice between balancing and buck-passing depends on whether the anarchic international system is of a bipolar, balanced, or unbalanced multipolar architecture. On another hand, state geographic location in terms of border sharing and stopping power of water also influences great powers' strategy preference. Combined together, these two variables allow him to establish that great powers tend to favor—to the contrary of defensive realism predictions—buck-passing over balancing in all instances of multipolarity except for those that include a potential hegemon. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.31. Wang, 2004, p.57. Feng, 2006, p. 69). Responding to defensive realists' posture on state behavior towards the most powerful state in the international system, Mearsheimer believes that threatened states will reluctantly engage in balancing against potential hegemon but that balancing coalitions are unlikely to form against a great power that has achieved regional hegemony. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 271) This lack of balancing is best explained by the regional hegemon's newly acquired status quo stance, which follows from the geographical constraints on its power projection capability. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.240, Snyder, 2002, p. 156) offensive realism includes explanations of both international outcomes pertaining to the systemic level of analysis and individual state behavior. Additionally, the inclusion of new variables such as geography alongside the distribution of power enhances offensive realism's potential to make specific assumptions about states pursue aggressive

actions and resort to balancing and buck-passing strategies. (Tuft, 2005, p. 401)

V. IRAN, TURKEY'S AND SAUDI ARABIA'S POSITIONS ON THE REGION

Syria's geographical location is of strategic importance because is primarily located in the Middle East and on the east coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Despite its neighbors such as The Zionist regime, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq, Syria's strategic importance is enormous. Another reason is the ability to transfer energy from Iraq and Iran through the ports of Baniyas and Tartus on the Mediterranean coast to Europe. Syria, located in western Asia, is a link between the three continents of Asia, Europe and Africa. It is an important part of the geopolitical and geostrategic part of West Asia. It also affects Lebanese political equations.

Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as the three players in the region, were directly involved in the Syrian crisis, and each of them has pursuing its own goals. Saudi-Syrian relations have traditionally been close due to ideological approach which comes from Sunni-Islam. Saudi Arabia is not satisfied with Iran's high influence in Syria and Lebanon. While, the most authoritarian political system of human rights, women's rights, democracy, and freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia has been completely neglected. For this reason, one of the countries involved in this crisis is the result of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, and efforts are being made to prevent all kinds of crises from entering the country. In other words, Saudi Arabia has traditionally been a conservative actor in the region, seeking to address threats to the Arab world and protect its security. (Barzegar, 2012, p. 3) Saudi leaders are concerned about maintaining political stability and regional security. Saudi estimates security and stability in the Arab world and developments in the Persian Gulf in the following ways:

- a) Supporting regional political activists who have the same strategic goals as Saudi Arabia and its allies.
- b) Vulnerability to the protection of the Persian Gulf in the Arabian Peninsula, in particular, and in general, against internal and external threats without the support of the US military.
- c) Iran's counter-influence in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, and its closest neighbor, Bahrain and other Persian Gulf states
- d) The reduction of deficits and interventions in the Arab world. (Kamrava, 2013, p. 26)
- e) The confrontation with Shiite influence in the Arab world. In other words, supporting extremist and Wahhabi Sunni groups against the Shiites.

VI. THEORIZING THE SUBJECT

The Saudis have not had a positive view of Syria since the death of Hafez al-Assad and the coming to power of Bashar al-Assad, because Bashar al-Assad acted independently of regional politics. For example, in the '90s triangle, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria to provide a common overall diplomacy of the Arab

world crises can be defined within the framework of this triangle. However, since the rise to power of Bashar al-Assad, the triangle was weakened and from 2005 was completely collapse and divided into two axes that are an axis of Syria and Iran in particular. (Ibid, p. 33) King Salman may triangle Union countries; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, the countries of the Middle East for avoiding Iran's growing influences in the region are effective. (Pienaar and Shokri, 2015, BBC) With the purchase of heavy weapons by Saudis and attacking on Yemeni and its military presence in Bahrain to suppress the opposition and support the Syrian rebels and terrorists, trying to keep their interests at any cost and provide for their own security. Therefore, according to this behavior, it can be argued that Saudi Arabia, for its security and influence in other areas tries to use offensive realism. Nevertheless, Iran's support of safety for all and support political solutions tries to maintain its role as a neutral element to acquire their interests. In this case, we can recognize Iran as a supporter of defensive realism, throughout.

Saudi Arabia is deeply concerned by Iran's regional influence, especially among Shiites. (Al-tamimi, 2012, p. 8) Moreover, tries to reduce Iran's influence. Saudi Arabia is trying to make some kind of conflict between Shiite and Sunnis in Syria. In fact, the Saudi leaders state that they have a duty to support Bashar's opponents. The Syrian government is also seen as a symbol of the Shiites due to its proximity to Iran. The Saudis justify this by considering the Sunni statistics against the Syrian government, which makes up 70% of the population. Saudis try to give a religious war and immune themselves to the wave of protests. Perhaps the Saudis in the region are pursuing part of the US policy on developments in the Arab world. When the Mohammad Reza Shah's regime in Iran collapse in 1979, Saudi Arabia became the closest ally of the United States in various fields including: Counter Iran's threats, maintaining the status quo in the region, increase the reasonable control of Sunni groups in Lebanon and pressure on OPEC2 to keep oil prices low. As a result, Saudi foreign policy in general is pragmatic and based on the security of the state and the monarchy. (Kamrava, 2013, p. 29)

For Iran, Syria was one of the first countries to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 revolution, and it was one of the few Arab countries that did not support Saddam Hussein (in Iraq 1980-1987 invasion war) against Iran. In other words, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian government has had close relations with Iran. Then Syria's importance to Iran, its counter-policies against Israelis, which has strategically located by the Syrian government with Iran, Hezbollah and the Hamas movement in Palestine, created part of the resistance because it creates the Shiite crescent as well. Syria has been a strategic ally of Iran in the region for the past 40 years, before the crisis in its country. Iranian officials have said that the Syrian crisis can only be resolved through political solutions. They also support Bashar al-Assad's government in the face of terrorist opposition by Shiite military advisers and militias. Iranian's officials argue that Syrian opposition victory and the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad causes to weaken Iran which is one of its most important allies in the

region. Due to that, will weaken the resistance to Israelis as well. In other words, withdrawal of the Syrian Baath party from the political scene will have a direct impact on developments in the region; if the position of Hezbollah and Hamas get compromised, Iranian influence in the region will ease and security issues will be more and more complicated. Of course, analysis of how Iranian assist to Hezbollah and Hamas, is very difficult regardless of the Syria. Iranian strategies are to not loss of at least part of the ability to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian militants and his Shiite allies in Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah group. (Nerguizian, 2012, p. 84)

In the current developments in Syria, Iran initially said the political solution is the best way for ending the conflicts, as well as the Assad government to implement political reforms. However, the developments in Syria have become an international issue and the competitive playing field is cross-regional and regional countries. After the acts of violence terrorist group (ISIS or ISIL) in Syria and Iraq, and begin the process of migrating to Western countries, and ISIS threat to the West plus bombing operations in those countries, world powers decided to make a new line to contrast against of violence. In this time, Iranian got the opportunity, and with protectionist measures and sending military advisors to Syria, its defense policy in the form of assistance extended to Syria and fight against ISIS. With the arrival of other countries such as Russia and Turkey in Syria as well as America, France, and Britain from the West, the war against terrorism was also associated with strategic contradictions. Because Iranians thought, sustaining the Bashar government is better than ISIS or other groups for its goals. Russia made a new strategy with Iran and Turkey recently as well, and got the alliance group against ISIS, especially for getting the main roles in the Middle East against US strategies. (Ibid, p. 86)

Although Turkey was generally not a global expansionist power, neighboring Kurds in the region sought to influence politics and sought to establish Kurdistan around the northern territory of the "fertile crescent" (Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon). Finally, with this progress, Turkey seeks to lead the Islamic world and prove the superiority of Turkish Islam. Ever since the Justice and Development Party came to power (AKP), Turkey has adopted a more convincing foreign policy and has seeking to become an important player in the international arena. (Rezaei, 2014) In fact, the party defined by Ahmad Davutoglu that the neo-Ottoman policy was called to create the power of the Turks of the Ottoman Empire. To this end, Turkey has demonstrated its goal of creating a regional sphere of influence, resolving the Kurdish issue, and becoming a major energy hub. Due to its geographical location, Turkey creates a sphere of influence that extends from North Africa to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. This country with the creation of this network by linking to partners and allies in the international arena will strengthen and can achieve its goals. This is one of the reasons for the introduction of "solving problems with neighbors' policy" that was defined by Davutoğlu. Although Turkey's

aspirations "of foreign policy no problem" and based on soft power was challenged, but it remains a hard power tool.

Following this process, but the most powerful armies in the world, which is the Turkish army, the confidence of economic and military power, the leaders of this country to believe that they can even a geopolitical map of the Middle East would change. Turkey also a procedurally similar issue in three years with its neighbors Iraq and Syria have taken. In fact, Turkey's policy since 2009 has taken an offensive look because, during this period, practically no threat to the security of the country on behalf of its southern neighbors has occurred. in the Syrian crisis, Turkey's aim, reform or not the overthrow of the dictatorial regime, but to direct control by screwing Bashar al-Assad of Syria and its future and in the meantime, has been trying in every way possible, to overthrow the current regime in Damascus. Which unlike many NATO members and a key allies of the United States (Great Britain and France) in America's war against Syria, isolated themselves, Turks officials clearly declared its readiness in this battle and insisted that the military option should be possible through Turkey. (Ibid, 2014, p. 25)

Thus, in recent years, Turkey's foreign policy toward Syria, Iraq, and even Libya, Egypt, Palestine, and Lebanon seems to be approaching an offensive realism. Turkey seeks to optimize the use of its power position and increase freedom of action in the Middle East and upset the balance of power in their favor

TABLE 3. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ACTORS IN TARGET COUNTRIES, EVALUATED BY AUTHOR

players	Syria	Bahrain	Yemen
Iran's strategy	Active role	Inactive role	Active role
	Defensive R	Defensive R	Defensive R
Saudi's strategy	Active role	Active role	Active role/war
	Defensive R	Offensive R	Offensive R
Turkey's strategy	Active role	Inactive role	Inactive role
	Offensive R	Defensive R	Defensive R

All players have different actions in their behaviors. For example, Iran seeks the support of the Syrian government, but with all its might (military advisers, humanitarian aid, medicine, food, etc.). As the Turkish government did, but at different levels. On the other hand, the Syrian government opposed the

invasion and opposition. In contrast, the Saudi government is trying to gain influence in the Arab region and support the opponents in Syria with its strategy. However, in the case of Bahrain, Iran and Turkey are in favor of appropriate political solutions and seeking the defensive policy. While Saudi Arabia has a different strategy in this country and has tried to suppress the protests with aggression. In Yemen, Iran's strategy is supporting Houthi militias, but it opposes announcing its support clearly. Because the Houthi group's opinion is close to the Iranian ideology. (Jahener, 2012, p. 36) Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, opposes the Houthis and seeks to counter Iran's influence in its privacy regarding Shiite and Sunnite confrontation idea. In addition, the fugitive Yemeni president Hadi, has asked them for help, and he is trying to protect his interests by launching a military attack on Yemen for more than 5 years now. In fact, it wants to maintain its security. This means that in Yemen and Syria, we can see competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. They are trying to influence areas that are not sustainable. By spreading their military actions on the region for System in which state seeks to maximize power and influence in order to achieve security through domination and hegemony that is part of offensive realism in its policy. In 2015, Turkey implicitly disclosed its expansionist policies in support of Saudi Arabia's Offensive against Yemen (Mizanonline.ir, 2015). Turkey is trying to control Kurds in the border and afraid of strengthen of Kurds in the region. Nevertheless, Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria are a Potential threat to turkey national security because turkey will not lose the territory and its control about Kurds in the region. Therefore, the Turks have continued this offensive method to consolidate their hegemony, and they are considering the conditions for the presence of the Kurds in the borderlands between the three countries in a protected manner. Realistic offensive policies show governments seek to increase their power in other countries. Such a system has built inside and alliances with foreign players, trying to disrupt the power structure in its areas. In fact, these factors in international relations literature threaten other actors. Given the performance of the three countries described in this article, it is clear what strategy they are currently pursuing. However, this article may not cover all the factors, as well as the issues related to the military aids.

VII. CONCLUSION

In the Middle East, given the geopolitical and geostrategic situation and religious concepts, all activities are complex and very sensitive.

In this paper, we examine three important regional powers by examining Shiite ideology and Turkish nationalism and radical Sunni ideology, which will jeopardize other interests by expanding and influencing each of these perspectives. Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as Turkey's foreign policy orientation, would base on two elements, ideological and geopolitical. They seek to play in their regional security and increase their influence as much as others. Iran's strategies goals are more defensive and practical, and most importantly, it seeks to fill security challenges. In foreign defense policy, governments seek to increase relative security. When they feel threatened, will try to increase their power. Due to its defensive nature, Iran's foreign

policy has forced to change its attitude towards Syria and seek to increase its power. Saudi Arabia is trying to pursue an offensive policy, preventing the expansion of its internal borders as a wave of revolution in the region (after Arab Spring). Analyzing Saudi Arabia's policy after the regional revolutions show their conditions for maintaining regional order, not only monitoring developments to maintain regional structures but also try to provide comprehensive and decisive effects on the protesters. Saudi conservative foreign policy, on the one hand, is offensive because of its desire to maintain the status quo, but at the same time as trying to use political, economic, and security management tools to win the region's developments. In order to advance its goals in Syria and to support the new al-Qaeda-backed armed groups in Syria, Saudi Arabia cannot either reform the electoral system in Syria because free elections have never taken place in that country which aligns with its interests in the region and prevents Iran's influence in the region. After the emergence of the Justice and Development Party, Turkey's policy have created by "strategic depth and zero tensions with its neighbors." As unrest erupted in Syria, they took an interventionist stance, demanding Assad's removal from power. This strategic change was the first step for Turkey. After the military-backed of oppositions in Syria and invaded the country, its strategy changed to offensive realism. Turkey has joined Russia and Iran in defending Bashar al-Assad's government against ISIS and the power transmission after the current situation during last years.

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